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Inefficient private renegotiation of soverign debt.

By: Kletzer, M.K.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookSeries: Working Papers Series; No. 441. Publisher: Washington : World Bank, 1990Subject(s): Debt | Debt repaymentSummary: This paper analyzes possible distortions arising in negotiations between private creditors and sovereign borrowers.
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This paper analyzes possible distortions arising in negotiations between private creditors and sovereign borrowers.

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