The Role of the Person in Modern Constitutional Law: How State-inflicted Harms Become Personal
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Main Library | https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/S1059-43372022000087A005/full/html (Browse shelf) | https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/S1059-43372022000087A005/full/html | Available |
This chapter examines the role of the person in modern constitutional law. Through a reading of two Canadian Supreme Court decisions – RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery and R. v. Malmo-Levine – it suggests that while the person is the subject of modern constitutional law’s protective gaze, it can also sometimes function as a scapegoat, taking the fall for harms engineered in part by the state (harms, in other words, that really ought to attract constitutional scrutiny given constitutional law’s orienting preoccupation with ‘state action’)
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